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FOURTH AMENDMENT-WARRANTLESS
ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS OF
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981).
Last term the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of warrantless administrative inspections of commercial property. In Donovan v.
Dewey1 the Court upheld a provision of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 19772 which authorizes warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines.3 In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized the strong federal interest in regulating extremely hazardous
industries such as mining, the necessity of warrantless inspections for
effective enforcement of the statute, and the statute's comprehensive and
predictable procedural provisions.4 However, the Court again failed to
provide a clear explanation of when the fourth amendment 5 requires a
warrant for administrative inspections of commercial property. Consequently, the confusion which has characterized this area of fourth
amendment law continues.
This Note first examines the major precedents leading up to Dewey
and points out their inconsistencies. Next, the facts of Dewey and its
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions are presented. Third, the
extent to which Dewey is consistent with precedent is discussed. Fourth,
the correctness of the Court's decision, apart from considerations of stare
decisis, is evaluated. Finally, the Note addresses the importance of
Dewey for future litigation and legislation in the area of administrative
warrants.
I. BACKGROUND

Until fairly recently, the Supreme Court considered administrative
1 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981).
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. III 1979).
3 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. I1 1979).
4 101 S. Ct. at 2540-41.
5 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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inspections beyond the scope of the fourth amendment. In Frank v. MaVland,6 the Court narrowly upheld a Baltimore city ordinance which
permitted the warrantless inspection of any dwelling thought to contain
a nuisance. 7 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, stressed that
such inspections promoted the public health, were based on at least a
suspicion of wrongdoing, and were conducted in a reasonable manner.8
Justice Frankfurter concluded that the type of inspection at issue
"touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official
intrusion.
... 9
Frank was overruled eight years later in the companion cases of

Camara v. MunicipalCourt'0 and See v. City of Seattle." At issue in Camara
was a provision of the San Francisco Housing Code authorizing certain
city employees to make warrantless inspections of buildings.' 2 In invalidating the provision, the Court concluded that it had erred earlier in
upholding warrantless administrative inspections on the grounds that
the affected interests were "merely 'peripheral'" to the fourth amendment. 13 Justice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that "[i]t is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and.his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior."' 14 Consequently, the Court held that a
warrant is necessary for administrative inspections of dwellings in order
to assure residents that an inspection is within the scope of a valid ordi6 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overddin, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
7 The Baltimore City Code provides:
Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists
in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if
the owner or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit and pay foi every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.
359 U.S. at 361 (quoting BALTIMORE, MD., Crry CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950)).
8 359 U.S. at 366-67.
9 Id at 367. In dissent, Justice Douglas, with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Brennan concurring, argued that the fourth amendment protects citizens from warrantless inspections of their homes regardless of the purpose of the inspection. Id at 374 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
10 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Court stated that it was necessary to re-examine Frank because of the increased use of administrative inspection plans and refined fourth amendment
analysis since Frank was decided. Id at 525.
" 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
12 Section 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code provides:
Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials,
have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the
City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code.
Quoted in 387 U.S. at 526.
13 Id at 530. The Court agreed with the Frank premise that administrative inspections are
less intrusive than searches related to criminal investigations.
14 Id (footnote omitted).
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nance or statute. 15 However, because of the substantial government interest in building code inspections and the relatively unintrusive nature
of such inspections, the Court further held that warrants for administrative inspections need not be based on "probable cause" that a particular
building contains code violations.1 6 The Court also noted that there was
no evidence that effective enforcement of the building code required
17
warrantless inspections.
In See v. City of Seattle, the holding of Camara was extended to include commercial enterprises.1 8 At issue in See was the refusal by the
owner of a commercial warehouse to permit a local fire department official to conduct a routine warrantless inspection of his property. 19 In
reversing criminal sanctions against the warehouse owner, the Court
stated that the constitutional rights of the businessman, like those of occupants of residential buildings, are "placed in jeopardy if the decision
to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and
enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evi'20
denced by a warrant.
Just three years later, however, the Court held that the fourth
amendment was not a bar to a warrantless administrative inspection of
a liquor dealer's premises by authorized agents of the Internal Revenue
Service. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,2 1 federal agents inspected the cellar of a caterer authorized to sell liquor under a federal
license.22 After the caterer had refused to open a locked liquor storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized liquor bottles they believed to have been refilled in violation of federal
law.2 3 The agents sought to justify the forcible entry on the grounds
that federal law permitted entry "so far as it may be necessary" of any
place where "any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced,
or kept. .... "24 Claiming that the exclusive remedy for a refused entry
15
16
17
18
19

Id at 532-33.
Id at 534.
Id at 533.
387 U.S. at 543.
Id at 541. City of Seattle Ordinance No. 87870, § 8.01.050 provides:

INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief
to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings,
as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected
any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of
any other ordinance concerning fire hazards.
Qutedin 387 U.S. at 541.
20 387 U.S. at 543.
21 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
22 26 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (1976).
23 26 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (1976) forbids the refilling of liquor bottles with any substance
other than that contained in the bottles at the time of stamping.
24 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1976) provides:
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was the imposition of a fine, 25 the Court disagreed and held that the
liquor bottles had to be returned to the caterer and suppressed as
26
evidence.
The most notable aspect of the Colonnade decision was that the only
limitation the Court recognized on the seizure of the liquor bottles was
statutory; none of the justices found the forcible entry unconstitutional. 27 In finding no fourth amendment violation, Justice Douglas relied almost entirely on the long history of close supervision and
28
inspection of the liquor industry.
A second exception to the warrant requirement for administrative
inspections arose in United States v. Biwell.29 There, the issue was the
constitutionality of a provision of the Gun Control Act of 196830 which
authorized warrantless inspections of records, documents, or firearms
kept by firearms dealers. 3 ' In upholding the provision, the Court's analThe Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises (including
places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or
other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations
issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such
dealer on such premises.
26 U.S.C. § 7606 (1976) provided:
(a) Entry during day.
The Secretary or his delegate may enter, in the daytime, any building or place where any
articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary, for the purpose of examining said articles or objects.
(b) Entry at night.
When such premises are open at night, the Secretary or his delegate may enter them
while so open, in the performance of his official duties.
25 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1976) provides for a $500 fine for anyone refusing to submit to a
request for an authorized inspection.
26 397 U.S. at 77.
27 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justices Black and Stewart
joined, argued that the statute permitted even forcible entries if necessary. Id at 81 (Burger,
J., dissenting).
28 Justice Douglas quoted from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), in which
the Court reasoned that because the same Congress that proposed the fourth amendment
enacted a statute which authorized warrantless administrative inspections as a means of enforcing liquor regulations, the fourth amendment could not have been intended to bar such
inspections. 397 U.S. at 76.
29 406 U.S. at 311 (1972).
30 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1976).
31 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976) provides:
Each licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, and licensed collector
shall maintain such records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other
disposition, of firearms and ammunition at such place, for such period, and in such form
as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may by regulations prescribe. Such importers, manufacturers, dealers, and collectors shall make such records available for inspection at all
reasonable times, and shall submit to the Secretary such reports and information with
respect to such records and the contents thereof as he shall by regulations prescribe. The
Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of
any firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector for the purpose
of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept by such
importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector under the provisions of this chapter or regu-
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ysis differed markedly from that in Colonnade. In Biswell, the Court emphasized the need for warrantless inspections in order effectively to
enforce the statute. 32 The Court also stressed that a gun dealer's reasonable expectations of privacy are minimal because all licensed dealers are
informed yearly of comprehensive regulations, including the possibility
of inspection. 33 Consequently, "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in
this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he
does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection. '34 While recognizing
that federal firearms regulations were only recently enacted, the Court
observed that, nonetheless, "close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of
central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime ... ."535
The opinion concluded with what the majority 36 presumably considered
to be a practical rule to govern warrantless administrative inspection
cases: "where. .. regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest,
[sic] and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of
impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a warrant
37
where specifically authorized by statute."
An inspection program considered by the Court to have excessive
potential for abuse was held unconstitutional in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. 38 At issue was section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA)39 which authorized warrantless inspections of
workplaces subject to OSHA's jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the existence of safety hazards or violations of OSHA regulations.4
lations issued under this chapter, and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by
such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector at such premises ...
32 406 U.S. at 316. For example, the Court distinguished See by observing that violations
of building codes, unlike gun control regulations, are "relatively difficult to conceal or to
correct in a short time." Id

33 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(19) (1976).
34 406 U.S. at 316.
35 Id at 315.
36 Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter, argued that the statute in Biswell was similar to that
at issue in Colonnade and, therefore, prohibited forcible entries. Because the gun dealer consented to the search only after being informed of the statute, Douglas reasoned that entry had
been forcible and invalid. Id at 317-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37 Id at 317.
38 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Barlow, the president and general manager of an electrical and
plumbing installation business, sought an injunction against the warrantless inspection of the
non-public areas of his business. Id at 310. A three-judge panel, believing Camara and See to
be controlling, held that OSHA agents could not inspect Barlow's business without a warrant.
Barlow's v. WJ. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976).
39 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976).
40 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976) provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge is authorized(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
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The Supreme Court concluded that permitting warrantless inspections
"devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and
whom to search."'4 ' The Court distinguished Colonnade and Biswell by
asserting that "they represent responses to relatively unique circumstances. '"42 Industries such as liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell)
have "a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any
person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware"
and, consequently, any person who enters such a business has "voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation."'43 Quoting from Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,44 the Court
concluded: "'[t]he businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.' ,,45 Thus, the owners and operators of pervasively regulated businesses have no reasonable
expectation of privacy and are, therefore, subject to warrantless administrative inspections. 46 The Court intimated that the OSHA regulations, however, were not sufficiently pervasive to render unreasonable
47
any expectations of privacy persons subject to the statute might have.
Marshallv. Barlow's also found that warrantless inspections were not
necessary for effective enforcement of the statute, especially since the
great majority of owners and operators probably would consent to inspections without a warrant. 48 As to those occasions when consent is not
given, the Court stated that while OSHA "regulates a myriad of safety
details that may be amenable to speedy alteration or disguise,

'49

it is not

construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by
an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent or employee.
OSHA also has a general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976), which provides that each
employer:
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees ...
41 436 U.S. at 323.
42 Id at 313.
43 Id

44 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
45

Id. at 271, quotedat 436 U.S. 313.

46 436 U.S. at 313.
47 d at 314.
48 Id at 316. The Court conceded in a footnote that its holding in Barloew might result in
an increased number of refusals to submit to warrantless inspections. The Court added that it
would have to wait to determine "how serious an impediment to effective enforcement.
its decision might be. Id at 316 n.l1.
49 Id at 316.
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"immediately apparent why the advantages of surprise would be lost if,
after being refused entry, procedures were available for the Secretary to
seek an exparte warrant and to reappear at the premises without further
'50
notice to the establishment being inspected.
Additionally, the Court emphasized that an administrative warrant
requirement was practical. The issuance of a warrant need not depend
on a demonstration of traditional probable cause. 5 1 In fact, "[a] warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA
search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement
of the Act derived from neutral sources . . . would protect an em-

ployer's Fourth Amendment rights. '52 The Court rejected the argument that the benefits derived from the issuance of warrants on less than
probable cause are outweighed by high administrative costs. A warrant
requirement will provide "assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute,
and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral
53
criteria."
Finally, the Court stated that its holding was limited to the provisions of OSHA. 54 Whether provisions of other statutes authorizing war-

rantless inspections are constitutional "will depend upon the specific
enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. '55 The
Court observed that statutes pervasively regulating a single industry
50 Id at 319-20 (footnote omitted). After the decision in Barlow's, the Secretary of Labor
amended OSHA regulations to include provisions for obtaining exparte warrants after entry is
refused. A warrant may be obtained even before entry is attempted if the employer's past
practice indicates that a warrantless inspection will not be allowed. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(b),
(d) (1980). In promulgating the amended provisions, the Secretary stressed the need for surprise inspections in order to enforce effectively OSHA regulations. 45 Fed. Reg. 65918 (1980).
The Court in Barlow's does not explain how OSHA inspectors avoid losing the advantage of
surprise when they must rely on a warrant after their initial attempts to inspect are unsuccessful. Even if the return visit is unannounced the owner or manager will, in many cases, have
been given ample time to comply with regulations and avoid sanctions. Such tactics do result
in compliance with the regulations; however, such compliance may be short-lived. Furthermore, persons not wishing to comply with OSHA regulations may simply delay compliance
until an OSHA official first attempts to conduct an inspection. Barlow'r also failed to account
for the different approach taken in Biswell where warrantless inspections were justified on the
basis of the relative ease of concealing regulatory violations.
51 436 U.S. at 320. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, attacked the majority opinion for being unfaithful to the intentions of the framers of the fourth amendment by permitting warrants to issue on less than full
probable cause. In Stevens' opinion, "the Warrant Clause has no application to routine,
regulatory inspections of commercial premises." Id at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens
argued that the proper test of such programs is whether they are "reasonable." Id.
52 Id at 321 (footnote omitted).
53 Id at 323 (footnote omitted).
54 Id

at 321-22.

55 Id at 321.
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might be upheld on the basis of the Colonnade-Birwell exception.56 The
Court also approvingly cited inspection schemes requiring inspectors to
obtain court orders when refused entry.5 7 Despite these indications, a
clear test for the constitutionality of statutes authorizing warrantless administrative inspections was not established by Barlow s. In Colonnade,
the focus was almost entirely on the long history of regulation; in Biswell
the Court emphasized the strong federal interest in gun control, the
need for warrantless inspections, and the lack of any reasonable expectations of privacy on the part of firearms dealers. Ift Barlow's, the Court
stressed the excessive discretion possessed by OSHA inspectors and the
practicality of a warrant requirement based on less than traditional
probable cause. It was against this confused background that the Court
addressed the issues in Donovan v. Dewey.
II.

DONOVAN V. DEWEY

Section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
("FMSHA" or "Act") 58 requires that federal mine inspectors inspect
surface mines at least twice a year for the purpose of enforcing FMSHA
regulations. The Act defines a "mine" in such a way as to include stone
quarries.5 9
In 1978, a federal mine inspector attempted to inspect a lime and
56 Id

57 Id, n.18. The Court cited a provision of the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine
Safety Act of 1966, formerly 30 U.S.C. § 733(a) (1976), now incorporated into the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. III 1979).
58 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
(a) Authorized representatives of the Secretary or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall make frequent inspections and investigations in coal or other
mines each year for the purpose of (1) obtaining, utilizing, and disseminating information relating to health and safety conditions, the causes of accidents,and the causes of
diseases and physical impairments originating in such mines, (2) gathering information
with respect to mandatory health or safety standards, (3) determining whether an imminent danger exists, and (4) determining whether there is compliance with the mandatory
health or safety standards or with any citation, order, or decision issued under the subchapter or other requirements of this chapter. In carrying out the requirements of this
subsection, no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person, except
that in carrying out the requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare may give advance notice of inspections. In carrying out the requirements of clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection, the Secretary shall
make inspections of each underground coal or other mine in its entirety at least four
times a year, and of each surface coal or other mine in its entirety at least two times a
year. The Secretary shall develop guidelines for additional inspections of mines based on

criteria including, but not limited to, the hazards found in mines subject to this chapter,
and his experience under this chapter and other health and safety laws. For the purpose
of making any inspection or investigation under this chapter, the Secretary, or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, with respect to fulfilling his responsibilities
under this chapter, or any authorized representative of the Secretary or the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal
or other mine.
59 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979) defines a "mine" as "an area of land from

1230

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 72

stone quarry to determine whether 25 safety and health violations uncovered earlier had been corrected. 60 Douglas Dewey, president of the
company, insisted that the inspector obtain a search warrant before continuing his inspection of Dewey's quarry. 61 The official issued a citation
to Dewey for refusing to permit the inspection 62 and the Secretary of
Labor filed suit in district court seeking to have Dewey enjoined from
refusing to permit a warrantless inspection. 6 3 The district court
granted 64 Dewey's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
section 103(a) of FMSHA was unconstitutional as applied to the inspection of stone quarries. The court read Barlow's as requiring warrants for
all administrative inspections of commercial property except those involving industries with long histories of pervasive regulation. 65 Noting
that stone quarries were not subject to federal regulation until 1966,66
the court concluded that Dewey's stone and lime business did not fall
within the Colonnade-Biswell exception. 67 The Secretary of Labor ap68
pealed directly to the Supreme Court.
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's
decision. 6 9 The opinion, written by Justice Marshall, began with a review of significant precedents. Citing Biswell, Justice Marshall observed
that while a warrant requirement applied generally to inspections of
which minerals are extracted in nonliquid form or, if in liquid form, are extracted with workers underground."
60 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2537.
61 Id

62 Under 30 U.S.C. § 820(a) (Supp. III 1979), the Secretary of Labor is required to adopt
penalties for violations of the Act. The Secretary established that anyone who fails "to permit
an authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor to perform an inspection or investigation. . ."is subject to penalty. 30 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1980). The maximum penalty is $10,000.
30 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1980).
63 101 S. Ct. at 2537.
64 Marshall v. Dewey, 493 F. Supp. 963 (E.D. Wis. 1980), rev d, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981).
65 Id at 964.
66 Id at 966. Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, 30 U.S.C. §§ 72324 (1976) (repealed 1977).
67 493 F. Supp. at 965.
68 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) provides in part: "Any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United
States. . .holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional. .. ."
69 101 S. Ct. at 2536. Three courts of appeals had upheld section 103(a) of the Act as it
applied to quarries. In upholding section 103(a) as applied to a gravel pit, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that it was more narrowly drawn than the OSHA provision at issue in Barlow's,
that FMSHA provides for immediate judicial review if entry is refused, and that the mining
industry has long been subject to federal regulation. Marshall v. Texoline Co., 612 F.2d 935,
937-38 (5th Cir. 1980). Similar reasoning was employed in Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand
Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980) (upholding inspection
of sand and gravel operation) and Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589
(3d Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980) (upholding inspection of plant in which lowgrade fuel was extracted from dredged sand).
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commercial property, the privacy interest of the owner "may, in certain
circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections. '70 Schemes permitting warrantless inspections of businesses may, however, be constitutionally objectionable "if
their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the
owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials. 7 1 The
Court cited both Colonnade and Biswell as cases which involved statutes
providing such assurances. 72 The opinion stated that these cases
make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to
further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property
cannot help but be aware that73his property will be subject to periodic inspections for specific purposes.
This test, the Court noted, was applied in Barlow-s to hold unconstitutional the OSHA provision permitting warrantless inspections. 74 The
OSHA provision "fail[ed] to tailor the scope and frequency-of such administrative inspections to the particular health and safety concerns.
75
posed by the numerous and varied businesses regulated by the statute"
and gave too much discretion to federal agents in terms of which businesses to inspect, when to inspect them, and what standards to employ
76
during the course of inspection.
In finding the FMSHA provision authorizing warrantless inspections free of the defects besetting the OSHA provision, the Court emphasized three factors: first, FMSHA addresses a specific and
substantial government interest; second, warrantless inspections are necessary for the statute's effective enforcement; and third, the statute is a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
Justice Marshall began his analysis by observing that "it is undisputed that there is a substantial federal interest in improving the health
'77
and safety conditions in the Nation's underground and surface mines."
He pointed out that "[i]n enacting the statute, Congress was plainly
aware that the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the
country and that the poor health and safety record of this industry has
70 101 S. Ct. at 2538.
71 d
72 Id

73 Id at 2539.
74 Id
75 Id
76 Id Str note 41 & accompanying text sup ra.
77 101 S. Ct. at 2539.
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significant deleterious effects on interstate commerce. 7 8 Justice Marshall also observed that FMSHA's focus on a dangerous industry was
79
not characteristic of the statute at issue in Barlow'.
The second factor stressed in the Court's decision is the need for
warrantless inspections in order to enforce effectively FMSHA regulations. The Court quoted a Senate report which emphasized the "notorious ease with which many safety or health hazards may be concealed"
by mine operators.80 Finding "no reason not to defer to this legislative
determination,"8 1 the Court accepted the conclusion of Congress that a
warrant requirement would make proper enforcement of FMSHA
impossible.
Persuaded of the need for warrantless inspections, Justice Marshall
stated that "the only real issue before us is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application,
provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." 82 Because FMSHA is "specifically tailored" to the health and safety concerns which gave rise to its enactment and its regulations are
"sufficiently pervasive and defined," the Act meets the test.83 The Court
noted that there is little uncertainty as to which mines will be inspected
and how frequently. 84 The Court also observed that there is little uncertainty regarding the standards with which mine operators are required
78 Id (footnote omitted). Concerning stone quarries, Justice Marshall stated that while
they are not explicitly mentioned in FMSHA, the hazardous nature of quarries may be inferred from their failing within the definition of "mine" in a statute "narrowly and explicitly
directed at inherently dangerous industrial activity. . . ." Id at 2539-40, n.7.
79 Id at 2540. It is not clear why Justice Marshall considered this to be so important, for
while OSHA applies to industries not generally regarded as being dangerous, the statute also
applies to very hazardous employment. A recent study conducted by the Center for Policy
Alternatives at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology indicates that OSHA regulations
have significantly reduced work-related injuries. The study found that during 1974 and 1975
OSHA safety regulations saved 60,000 workdays, 350 deaths, and 15 billion dollars. See Worsham, OSHA, Labor's "Big Stick'" May Be Turned Into a Twig, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 7, 1981,
§ 1, at 1, col. 1.
80 101 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprintedin
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3401, 3427). The Senate Report also notes with approval the decision in Youghioghen & Ohio Coal Company v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.
Ohio 1973), in which the court upheld the constitutionality of warrantless inspections as provided, by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976),
superseded by 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. III 1979). S. REP. No. 95-181, supra, at 27, reprntedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra, at 3427.
81 101 S. Ct. at 2540.
82 Id
83 Id

84 Id Underground mines will be inspected at least four times each year, surface mines at
least twice. Mines generating explosive gasses must be inspected at irregular 5, 10, or 15 day
intervals. Additionally, mines where Code violations have been discovered during prior inspections, such as Dewey's lime and stone quarry, must be reinspected. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a)
(Supp. III 1979). See note 58 supra for text of provision.
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to comply.8 5 As was the case with the firearms statute in Biswell,8 6 FM87
SHA requires that mine operators be notified of relevant regulations.
The Court further noted that FMSHA prohibits forcible entries. 88 If a
mine operator refuses to permit a federal agent to conduct a warrantless
inspection, the Secretary of Labor must seek an injunction against such
a refusal. 89 The Court stressed that this provision acts as a safeguard
against unreasonable invasions of unique privacy interests.9 0 In light of
FMSHA's specificity, predictability, and safeguards, Justice Marshall
concluded that a warrant requirement would fail to provide additional
protection for the fourth amendment privacy interest of mine
operators. 9'
Concerning the relatively short time that stone quarries have been
subject to federal regulation, the Court stated that the length of time an
industry has been regulated is an important but not controlling factor in
determining the regulatory scheme's constitutionality. 92 If a lengthy
history were required to uphold a statute's constitutionality, recently developed industries, regardless of how potentially dangerous, would remain forever immune from warrantless inspections. Such a result, the
Court concluded, is "absurd" and is precluded by the fourth amendment's "central concept of reasonableness. .. ."9

In a brief concurring opinion, 94 Justice Stevens reiterated his dissatisfaction with the Court's decisions in Camara and Barlow-s.95 According
to Justice Stevens, "neither the longevity of a regulatory program nor a
businessman's implied consent to regulations imposed by the Federal
Government determines the reasonableness of a Congressional judgment
that the public interest in occupational health or safety justifies a program of warrantless inspections of commercial premises."'95 However,
because Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the statutes in
Barlow's and Donovan are distinguishable, he concurred without discuss85 101 S. Ct. at 2541. The regulations appear in the statute and in Title 30 of the CODE
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

86 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1976).
87 30 U.S.C. § 811(3) (Supp. III 1979).
88 101 S. Ct. at 2541 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. III 1979)).
89 Id
90 Id The Court cited Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.
1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980), as an example of how FMSHA can protect unique
privacy interests. There, the court ordered inspectors to maintain the confidentiality of a
mine's trade secrets. Id at 594.

91 101 S. Ct. at 2541.
92 Id at 2541-42.
93 Id at 2542.

94 Id at 2542-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95 See note 51 supra.
96 101 S.Ct. at 2542 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ing the merits of overruling Camara.97
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment, 98 argued that the
Court's reasoning does not support its holding. Justice Rehnquist perceived the Court's rationale to be that mines are so pervasively regulated
that an owner or operator could have no reasonable expectation of privacy. He expressed doubt that the Court would uphold a similarly detailed criminal statute authorizing warrantless searches of property on
which illegal drug activity was reasonably suspected. 99 However, because Dewey's stone and lime quarry "was largely visible to the naked
eye without entrance onto [his] property," Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the warrantless inspection was valid under the "open-fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States. 0 0
Justice Stewart began his lone dissent by stating that, although he
dissented in Camara, he "must, nonetheless, accept the law as it
is. . . ."101 According to Justice Stewart, the law as developed in Colonnade, Biswell, and Barlow-s is that a warrant is required to conduct an

administrative inspection of commercial property unless the businesses
subject to the inspection "are both pervasively regulated and have a long
history of regulation."'10 2 Justice Stewart believed that the majority
"conveniently discards" the requirement of a lengthy history of regulation and, with it, the rationale for the exception itself.'0 3 For Justice
Stewart, a long regulatory history permits the inference that an operator
or owner has, in effect, consented to warrantless inspections. If a lengthy
history of regulation is not required then it is possible that some owners
or operators will enter a business before warrantless inspections are authorized by statute. 10 4 In such a case, Justice Stewart argued, it makes
97 Id

98 Id at 2543.
99 Id Justice Rehnquist's comment unaccountably ignores the distinction the Court has
made between administrative and criminal searches. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971). Moreover, Justice Rehnquist misrepresents the majority's reasoning. The Court did
not uphold the provision at issue simply because the mining industry is pervasively regulated.
See notes 12-16 & accompanying text supra.
100 265 U.S. 57 (1954). Hester held that a trespass by government agents onto a privately
owned field is not a violation of the fourth amendment as long as the agents do not enter the
area immediately surrounding the owner's dwelling. In Air Pollution Variance Board v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), the Court cited Hester in upholding the warrantless trespass onto private commercial land in order to obtain a smoke sample. Justice Rehnquist's use of the "open fields" doctrine is inappropriate. The inspection of Dewey's quarry
was of areas well beyond the "open fields" surrounding his operation. That the quarry may
have been "largely visible" to a person standing outside of Dewey's property does not, by
itself, justify a thorough inspection of its operation.
101 100 S. Ct. at 2543 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
102 Id at 2544 (emphasis added).
103 Id
104 Id
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little sense to say that the businessman has consented to the restriction.
Applying this analysis to the facts at issue, Justice Stewart concurred
with the district court's holding that because quarries have only recently
05
been regulated, FMSHA, as applied to quarries, is unconstitutional.
III.

ANALYSIS

Dewey can be analyzed in three ways: first, the extent to which it is
consistent with Colonnade, Biswell and Barlow-s; second, whether the decision was, apart from these precedents, decided correctly; and, third,
whether the decision has significant precedential value.
A.

DEWEY AND ITS PRECEDENTS

The Court in Colonnade, Biwell, and Barlow-s examined in various
ways the following factors: the length of time the industry subject to a
statute has been federally regulated; the necessity of warrantless inspections for effective enforcement of the statute; the amount of discretion
given federal inspectors; the presence or absence of a provision safeguarding unique privacy interests; the reasonable privacy expectations
of persons subject to the statute; the amount of additional protection
against unreasonable invasions of privacy an administrative warrant
would provide; whether the statute applies to a single industry; and the
nature of the federal interest.
History of Regulation
In Dewey, the Court's position on the importance of a lengthy regulatory history differed considerably from its position in Barlow's. The
Court in Barlow-s' ruled that the distinguishing feature of valid warrantless inspection programs is that they are directed at industries long subject to detailed federal regulation.106 Since stone quarries have been
subject to such regulation for only a relatively short period, the Court in
Dewey was forced to de-emphasize the significance of this brief history in
order to uphold the provision of FMSHA authorizing warrantless inspections.10 7 In considering the duration of a regulatory scheme to be
only one factor affecting its constitutionality, the Court in Dewey is consistent with Biswell which upheld warrantless inspections of an industry
which had been federally regulated for less than five years.' 08 For this
reason, Justice Stewart was incorrect when he stated in his dissent that
the Colonnade-Biswell exception is limited to industries pervasively regu105 Id at 2545-46.
106 436 U.S. at 313.
107 101 S. Ct. at 2541.
108 406 U.S. at 315.
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lated and having a lengthy history of regulation. 0 9
Necessity of Warrantless Inspections
In stressing the ease with which FMSHA violations can be concealed, 10 the Court's opinion is similar to Biswell. There, the Court
concluded that because violations of firearms regulations are easy to
conceal, warrantless inspections are necessary for effective enforcement
of the Gun Control Act."' While the Court in Colonnade did not explicitly indicate the need for warrantless inspections, it did recognize that
Congress has "broad power to design such powers of inspection under
the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand."' "12 Acknowledging that many OSHA violations are easy to conceal, the Court
in Barlow-s nonetheless ruled that warrantless inspections are unnecessary because the element of surprise can be preserved by an exparte warrant obtained either after entry is refused or before an inspection is
attempted." 3 It would seem that this conclusion would apply equally to
the inspection of mines for violations of FMSHA regulations. If obtaining ex parte warrants would not jeopardize enforcement of those OSHA
regulations the violations of which are easy to conceal, it is unclear why
having to obtain such warrants would interfere with the enforcement of
FMSHA.
The Court's position on the significance of the OSHA' 14 and FMSHA' 5 provisions which require inspectors to seek court orders when
entry is refused is also confusing. In Barlow's, the Court concluded that
the existence of such a provision is evidence that warrantless inspections
are unnecessary." 6 The Court in Dewey approved of a similar provision
without discussing its impact on the necessity of warrantless inspections. 11 7 Finally, the Court in Barlow's stressed that one reason warrantless OSHA inspections are unnecessary is that the "great majority" of
employers will consent to warrantless inspections."18 While the same
can probably be said about inspections under FMSHA,119 the Court in
Dewey did not make such a statement.
109 101 S. Ct. at 2545 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110 See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

406 U.S. at 316.
397 U.S. at 76.
See notes 48-50 & accompanying text supra.
29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1977).
30 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. III 1979).
436 U.S. at 317-19.
101 S. Ct. at 2541 (discussing 30 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. III 1979)).
118 436 U.S. at 316.
119 The government presented no evidence that a significant number of mine owners and
operators refuse entry. See generally Brief for Appellee, Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct. 2534
(1981).
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Inspector Discretion
It is difficult to reconcile the Court's conclusion in Dewey that the
discretion of FMSHA inspectors is minimal 20 with the Court's statement in Barlow-s that OSHA inspectors are given "almost unbridled discretion."121 In Barlow-s, the Court declared unconstitutional a statute
which authorized warrantless inspections of workplaces for the purpose
of inspecting working conditions and questioning employers and employees.122 Inspections were required to be made "during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits
and in a reasonable manner .... ,123 Inspectors were required to show
credentials 24 and explain the nature and purpose of the visit. 125 Inspections were also conducted in accordance with an administrative plan
"based upon accident experience and the number of employees exposed
in particular industries."'126 The Court in Dewey described the OSHA
inspection scheme as "leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections
to the unchecked discretion of government officers .... ,,127 In distinguishing FMSHA, the Court stressed the requirement that all mines be
inspected every year. 28 It is unclear how mandatory inspections substantially diminish the discretion of field inspectors. Furthermore, in
neither Biwell nor Colonnade were periodic inspections mandatory.
Equally confusing, in light of the reasoning in Barlows, is the Court's
view that the discretion exercised by the inspectors in Biswell was not
excessive. The Gun Control Act authorizes warrantless inspections of
the premises, including non-public areas, of firearms dealers, manufacturers, importers, and collectors for the purpose of examining records,
firearms, or ammunition. 129 The only restriction on such inspections is
30
that they must occur during business hours.'
SafeguardProvisions
In Dewey, the Court for the first time emphasized the significance of
provisions safeguarding unique privacy interests of persons subject to
120 101 S. Ct. at 2541.
121 436 U.S. at 323. 122 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). For the full text of provision, see note 40 supra.
123 Id
124 Id

125 29 C.F.R. § 1903.7 (1977).
126 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Field Operations Manual, 1 EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4327.2 (1976), citedat
436 U.S. at 321.
127 101 S. Ct. at 2541.
128 See note 84 supa.

129 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976).
130 Id
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warrantless inspection schemes.' 31 In Colonnade, the Court saw no constitutional violation in forcible entries made pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless inspections.13 2 Similarly, in Biswell, the Court
upheld a statute which makes it a crime to refuse entry to authorized
inspectors,' 33 stating that consent to a lawful warrantless administrative
inspection "is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry."' 34 Only in Barlow's were
1 35
inspectors required to seek compulsory process if entry was refused.
While FMSHA also prohibits forcible entries,13 6 regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor allow a fine to be imposed on any mine
operator who refuses entry to an authorized inspector.' 37 The statute
upheld in Colonnade imposed a penalty on persons refusing entry; 138 the
OSHA inspection program invalidated in Barlow's did not.
Privay Expectations
The analysis in Dewey of the privacy expectations of owners and
operators of business subject to federal regulation is similar to that
found in Barlow's but somewhat different than in Biswell. In Biswell, the
emphasis was on a firearms licensee's justifiable expectations of privacy.
The Court reasoned that a firearms dealer who chooses to enter a pervasively regulated industry can have no justifiable expectation of privacy
because he should expect the regulations to be enforced. 139 In contrast,
the Court in Barlow's 14 0 and Dewey 141 focused on whether the inspection

scheme itself creates an expectation that inspections will occur. Thus,
the Court in Dewey stated that an inspection program is invalid if inspections are "so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner,
for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will
from time to time be inspected." 142 Additionally, Dewey does not rely on
the notion that mine owners and operators impliedly consent to warrantless inspections. This omission is significant in light of the position
taken in Barlow-s that owners and operators of businesses covered by
101 S. Ct. at 2541.
132 See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
133 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1976).
134 406 U.S. at 315.
135 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1977).
136 30 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. III 1976).
137 30 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1980). Dewey was fined $1,000 for refusing entry to the FMSHA
inspector. 101 S. Ct. at 2537, n.3.
138 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1976).
139 406 U.S. at 316.
140 436 U.S. at 313-14.
141 101 S. Ct. at 2540.
142 Id at 2538 (emphasis added).
'31
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to warrantless

Value of an Administrative Warrant
The amount of additional protection a warrant will provide against
unreasonable invasions of privacy will depend in part on how great the
possibilities of abuse are under the regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless inspections. The Court in Dewey stated that when administrative inspections are "random, infrequent, or unpredictable," warrants
are required in order to provide the "assurance of regularity" necessary
to protect the privacy interests of the person subject to the inspection. l4
The Court then added that the inspection schemes in Colonnade and Birwell did not require such an assurance.1 4 5 The natural inference would
be that under those schemes inspections were not "random, infrequent,
or unpredictable." However, it was not for this reason that the Court
upheld the statutes at issue. In Colonnade, the Court based its decision on
the long history of "close supervision and inspection" of the alcoholic
beverage industry.'4 The Court in Biswell stressed that a traditional
warrant requirement would frustrate the enforcement of the statute and
that the protections of an administrative warrant would be "negligible"
if it preserved "the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency. 1 47 Thus, it appears that the Court in Dewey recast the rationales of Colonnade and Biswell in order to justify the holding that warrants
were not required.
The Court in Dewey also did not satisfactorily explain why the conclusion reached in Barlow's that "[a] warrant. . . would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is .reasonable under the
Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan .148 is not applicable to inspections under FMSHA. Certainly a mine owner's interest in the constitutionality and legality of a
FMSHA inspection is no less than that of an employer subject to OSHA
inspections. Such an interest is not, as the Court suggests, 149 served by
mandatory periodic inspections and notification of relevant health and
safety standards.
143

436 U.S. at 313.

44I101 S. Ct. at 2538.
145 Id

U.S. at 77.
406 U.S. at 316.
436 U.S. at 323.
101 S. Ct. at 2540-41.

146 397
147
148
149
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Single Industy Restriction
In seeking to distinguish FMSHA from OSHA, the Court in Dewey
150
observed that FMSHA, unlike OSHA, is limited to a single industry.
Barlow's contained a suggestion that the constitutionality of a warrantless inspection scheme may depend in part on whether it is directed at a
single industry. 15 1 While neither Colonnade nor Biswell discussed the issue, both dealt with statutes regulating a single industry.
Nature of the FederalInterest
In Dewey, the Court emphasized the dangerousness of mining and
the strong federal interest in enforcement of safety and health standards. 152 Similarly, Biswell stressed the need to regulate firearms traffic
in order to reduce violent crime.153 While the OSHA inspection scheme
was invalidated in Barlow's, the Court nonetheless stressed the strong
federal interest in promoting employee safety in concluding that inspection warrants would not require a demonstration of traditional probable
cause. 154 Only in Colonnade was the federal interest not one of health
and safety; there, the interest was the collection of tax revenue from
federal licensees.
B.

DEWEY:

155

CORRECTLY DECIDED?

In upholding the constitutionality of section 103(a) of FMSHA, the
Court arrived at the proper conclusion but not altogether for the right
reasons. By attempting to reconcile the holding in Dewey with Colonnade,
Biswell, and Barlow-s, the Court emphasized factors which should not
affect the constitutionality of a warrantless inspection scheme.
In rejecting the district court's conclusion that because stone quarries have only recently been regulated they cannot be inspected without
a warrant, 156 the Court seemed to recognize the weakness of the Colonnade doctrine. Noting that "the duration of a particular regulatory
scheme will often be an important factor" in determining the scheme's
constitutionality, 15 7 however, the Court still attached too much significance to regulatory history. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion in Dewey 158 and in his dissent in Barlow's,159 the
150 Id at 2539.
151 436 U.S. at 321.
152 101 S. Ct. at 2539.
153 406 U.S. at 315.
154 436 U.S. at 320.
155 397 U.S. at 75.
156 101 S.Ct. at 2541-42.
157 Id at 2542.
158 Id
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60
longevity of a regulatory program is irrelevant to its reasonableness.1
It makes no sense to say that one of two statutes identical in almost all
respects is "more" constitutional because it was enacted fifty years
before the other. A bad law does not improve with age.
Similarly, the constitutionality of a statute authorizing warrantless
inspections of commercial property should not depend on whether the
statute addresses a single industry. Instead, as Justice Stevens stressed in
his dissent in Barlow-s, the Court's concern ought to be whether the inspection program is directed at only those health and safety dangers the
statute seeks to alleviate.' 6 1 An inspection scheme closely tailored to
federal interests is not more intrusive to the privacy interests of persons
subject to the statute simply because the statute applies to two industries
rather than one. Moreover, even if a single industry restriction has some
validity, it is difficult to see how FMSHA is strictly limited to a single
industry. As Justice Stewart noted in his dissent: "[F]MSHA, like
OSHA, relates to many different industries with widely disparate characteristics and occupational injury rates."' 62 In addition to traditional
coal mining, FMSHA applies to the processing of minerals.' 63 Thus, the
Act is designed to protect machine operators in a plant above ground as
well as coal miners below ground.
Most important, however, is that the Court failed to identify the
major issue. Concluding that a warrant requirement would impede the
enforcement of FMSHA, Justice Marshall stated that "the on.y real issue
before us is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant."' 16 4 While Justice Marshall noted the hazardous nature of mining, his conclusion that the FMSHA inspection scheme
provides "certainty and regularity" rested instead on his belief that mine
owners and operators have no actual expectation of privacy.' 65 Justice
159 436 U.S. at 336.
160 Obviously, a certain amount of time is necessary for persons affected by a regulatory
scheme to learn of its enactment. A requirement of a lengthy regulatory history cannot be
justified, as Justice Stewart attempts to do, on the basis that consent to warrantless inspections cannot otherwise be inferred. Even if implied consent were important to a regulatory
program's constitutionality, the program's history need not be lengthy. If a person enters an
industry before it becomes pervasively regulated, then a decision by that person to continue in
the business can be construed as consenting to the restrictions.
161 436 U.S. at 338 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 101 S. Ct. at 2545-46 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

163 30 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. III 1979).
164 101 S. Ct. at 2540 (emphasis added).
165 Justice Marshall's opinion illustrates the confusion surrounding the issue of whether a
lack of privacy expectations establishes the "reasonableness" or absence of fourth amendment
activity. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), held that government activities not

invading justifiable expectations of privacy are beyond the scope of the fourth amendment.
In Barlow'S, the Court, citing Katz, stated that persons subject to the statutes at issue in Colon-
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Marshall reasoned that because all mines must be inspected at least
twice each year and because the Secretary of Labor is required to inform
owners and operators of applicable regulations, owners and operators
"cannot help but be aware" that they " 'will be subject to effective inspection.'"166 Justice Marshall's concern with actual expectations of
privacy is also clear from his statement that an employer subject to
OSHA had "little real expectation that his business will be subject to
inspection ....

",167

Justice Marshall's position is surprising. The actual privacy expectation of mine owners and operators is irrelevant to the constitutionality
of FMSHA. The critical inquiry concerns the legitimate expectations of
privacy. 168 Thus, in holding that the use of pen registers to record dialed telephone numbers is not a "search," the Court in Smith v. Maryland 169 concluded that while the person placing the calls may have had
an actual expectation of privacy, he had no legitimate privacy interest.170 Determining the legitimacy of privacy expectations inevitably innade and Biswell had "no reasonable expectation of privacy." 436 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added). However, the Court's reasoning in Colonnade and Birwell assumed that the inspection
schemes are within the scope of the fourth amendment. Similarly, Justice Marshall, while
stressing that mine owners and operators have no expectations of privacy, nevertheless concluded that the FMSHA inspection scheme was "reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. . . ." 101 S. Ct. at 2536.
166 101 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316).
167 101 S. Ct. at 2539 (emphasis added).
168 The Court has used different expressions synonymously. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("legitimate expectation of privacy"); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 306, 313 (1978) ("reasonable expectation of privacy"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967) (justified reliance on privacy).
169 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
170 In Smith, the Court illustrates how the constitutionality of a statute is not determined
by the actual privacy expectations of those subject to it:
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television
that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation or privacy regarding their homes,
papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this
Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his
telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his
calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective
expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful
role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative
inquiry would be proper.
442 U.S. 735, 74041 n.5. Neither is the privacy expectation of the "reasonable person" determinative. Although a "reasonable person" would not expect that a government agent
equipped with a transmitting device would be hiding in a closet in the kitchen of an acquaintance with whom he was negotiating an illicit sale of drugs, the Court has held that such a
practice does not invade a justifiable expectation of privacy. United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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volves judgments about societal values. 1 71 In the case of the FMSHA
inspection scheme, such an analysis must assess the value of mine safety
and health regulations, the necessity for warrantless inspections, the
costs and benefits of an administrative warrant requirement, and the
intrusiveness of warrantless inspections.
FMSHA undeniably addresses a substantial government interest.
Mining is a hazardous industry. The costs of injuries and death to individual miners, their families, and society are substantial. 172 Given the
173
ease with which violations of FMSHA regulations can be concealed,
Congress reasonably concluded that surprise is essential for effective enforcement of the statute. The further conclusion that warrantless inspections are necessary is justified by the inability ofexparte warrants to
preserve surprise if obtained after entry is refused 174 and the likelihood
that the benefits of exparle warrants obtained prior to attempted inspection will be outweighed by the administrative costs incurred.
If a warrant were required, it would, under Camara and Barlow's, be
an "administrative" warrant issued on less than traditional probable
cause. Such a warrant would only ensure that an inspection is pursuant
to FMSHA and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. It
would not reflect judicial approval of the inspection scheme itself. For
this reason, administrative warrants would provide no significant additional protection of fourth amendment privacy interests. Furthermore,
the administrative costs of a warrant requirement could be substantial. 175 Finally, administrative warrants under FMSHA would trivialize
privacy inthe meaning of a warrant requirement and could jeopardize
76
terests when a traditional warrant should be required.1
Warrantless administrative inspections under FMSHA are relatively unintrusive. An owner or operator of an extremely hazardous industry subject to detailed safety and health regulations cannot
1 W. LAFAVE; SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.2 (1978).
note 78 & accompanying text supra.
173 See note 80 & accompanying text sufira.
174 See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
175 It is difficult to predict the cost of an administrative warrant requirement. The cost
would refldct the number of refused entries and the ease with which warrants could be obtained. Obviously, if warrants were issued almost as a matter of course in an exparte proceeding, the cost of a warrant requirement would be less than if warrant requests were commonly
denied in adversarial proceedings. Furthermore, rote issuance of such warrants diminishes
their protective purpose.
176 In his dissenting opinion in Barlow's, Justice Stevens argued that the Court "should not
dilute the requirements of the Warrant Clause in an effort to force every kind of governmental intrusion which satisfies the Fourth Amendment definition of a 'search' into a judicially
developed, warrant-preference scheme." 436 U.S. at 328. Similarly, Justice Clark, dissenting
in Camara and See, predicted that if an administrative warrant requirement were adopted,
warrants would be issued in "pads of a thousand or more." 387 U.S. 541, 554 (1967).
171 See

172

Set
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reasonably expect that such regulations will not be strictly enforced
through inspections. Any slight privacy interest of a mine owner or operator is not unconstitutionally invaded by warrantless inspections limited in scope to the safety and health regulations and in time to the
operating hours of the mine or quarry.
Under a system of warrantless inspections, it is inevitable that an
occasional inspector will abuse an owner's privacy interests by improperly conducting an inspection. However, the risk and damage of such
abuse is outweighed by the benefits to society of a system of warrantless
inspections of mines and quarries.1 77 Furthermore, unique privacy interests arguably can be better protected by a safeguard provision, such
as FMSHA's requirement 78 that inspectors seek compulsory process if
entry is refused, than by an administrative warrant requirement. 179 The
FMSHA provision provides a mine owner with the opportunity of
an administrative
presenting his case to a district court; under Barlow 's,
warrant can be obtained exparte before a magistrate.' 8 0
C.

THE VALUE OF DEWEY AS PRECEDENT

Considered together, Colonnade, Biswell, and Barlow's are inconsistent on the issue of what characteristics a statute authorizing warrantless
administrative inspections of commercial property must have in order to
be constitutional. By reaffirming these precedents and analogizing or
distinguishing FMSHA, the Court in Dewey failed to clarify the issue. It
is difficult to understand how the Court in Dewey upheld by an 8-1 margin an inspection scheme so similar to OSHA's. Consequently, the major questions concerning the limits of inspector discretion, the necessity
of warrantless inspections, and the additional protection of administrative warrants remain unanswered.
Some of the key questions are empirical: the number of employers
subject to OSHA who refuse warrantless inspections, the standards of
probable cause magistrates employ for administrative inspections, and
the actual administrative costs of a warrant requirement. If the benefits
of a warrant requirement for OSHA inspections are found to be outweighed by the costs, Dewey could become the key precedent, replacing
Colonnade and Biswell; if the benefits are found to outweigh the costs, the
177 Balancing the interest of the individual against the interests of society where the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy are slight is consistent with the Court's prior analysis of the fourth amendment. In upholding the police practice of "stop and frisk," the Court
in Terry v. Ohio concluded that the government interest in crime prevention and the safety of
police officers was greater than the intrusiveness of a "stop and frisk." 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
178 See note 89 & accompanying text supra.
179 See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 171, § 10.2.
180 See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
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holding in Dewey could be limited to its facts and the reasoning of Barlow-' would prevail.
In the meantime, the lesson of Dewey may be, as Justice Stewart
suggested in dissent, that Congress "can define any industry as dangerous, regulate it substantially, and provide for warrantless inspections of
If so, Congress may, to some extent, be able to circumits members."''
vent the holding of Barlow-' by separating OSHA regulations according
to industry and informing employers that warrantless inspections will be
made periodically.
IV.

CoNcLuSION

In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court upheld a provision of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 which requires periodic warrantless
administrative inspections of mines and quarries in order to promote the
effective enforcement of detailed safety and health regulations. The
holding of Dewey seems to be that warrantless administrative inspections
of commercial property are constitutional when Congress has reasonably determined that such inspections are necessary to enforce a regulatory scheme so comprehensive in its detail that a person subject to the
authorizing statute is certain that his business will be inspected periodically to determine whether he has complied with well defined health
and safety standards. However, because the Court reaffirmed prior decisions upholding statutes authorizing warrantless inspections but lacking the characteristics of the FMSHA provision, it is difficult to
determine whether in future cases the Court will require that statutes
authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of commercial property possess these characteristics.
THOMAS A. ROBERTS

181 101 S. Ct. at 2545-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

